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WHY THE END IS HERE FOR STATE DEATH 
TRANSFER TAXES AND HOW STATES SHOULD 
RESPOND 
INTRODUCTION 
While state death transfer taxes1 were once quite common, their 
prevalence has declined in recent years. When Congress enacted the modern 
federal estate tax in 1916,2 all but five states and the District of Columbia 
already had some sort of death transfer tax.3 By 1922, the number of states 
without a death transfer tax dropped to two plus the District of Columbia.4 
However, today only seventeen states and the District of Columbia still 
impose such taxes.5 While their prevalence has declined, the impact of state 
death transfer taxes on those still subject to them has not. Some state death 
transfer taxes are discriminatory in nature because they apply a higher tax 
rate on certain death transfers than others, typically based on the heir’s 
relationship to the decedent.6 Additionally, state death transfer taxes tend to 
alter individual decision-making and create interstate competition for 
wealthy residents.7 Further, state death transfer taxes impose a notable 
                                                 
1. State death transfer taxes come in two general forms, which both tax transfers at death: the 
estate tax and the inheritance tax. An estate tax is levied “upon the privilege of post-mortem 
disposition by the decedent, the tax being assessed upon the net estate of the decedent as a whole, rather 
than upon the amount received by each of the beneficiaries.” George F. Karch, The Apportionment of 
Death Taxes, 54 HARV. L. REV. 10, 10 (1940). An inheritance tax is levied “against the right or privilege 
of each beneficiary to receive property passing after death.” Id. This Note will refer to both the estate 
tax and inheritance tax when using the term “state death transfer tax.”  
2. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 200, 39 Stat. 756, 777. 
3. Eugene E. Oakes, Development of American State Death Taxes, 26 IOWA L. REV. 451, 468 
(1941).   
4. Id. Mississippi enacted an estate tax in 1918 (1918 Miss. Laws 94), New Mexico enacted an 
inheritance tax in 1919 (1919 N.M. Laws 260), and South Carolina enacted an inheritance tax in 1922 
(1922 S.C. Acts 800). Oakes, supra note 3. The remaining jurisdictions without a state death transfer tax 
were the District of Columbia, Florida, and Alabama. Id.  
5. See infra notes 62–64.  
6. See infra Part II.A. For example, Iowa exempts from its inheritance tax those transfers to 
spouses and lineal relatives, but imposes an inheritance tax rate of five to fifteen percent on most other 
transfers. IOWA CODE §§ 450.9, 450.10 (2018). 
7. See infra Part II.B. Taxpayers may choose to move states in their elderly years or find other 
ways to avoid state death transfer taxes. See Dean L. Surkin, The Impact of the Decoupling of State 
Estate Taxes on a Taxpayer’s Choice of Domicile, 101 J. TAX’N 49, 56 (2004); Ashlea Ebeling, Where 
Not to Die in 2018, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017 
/12/21/where-not-to-die-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/RDU2-HP5T]; Kay Bell, Moving to Escape State 
Estate Taxes, BANKRATE (July 28, 2015), https://www.bankrate.com/financing/taxes/moving-to-
escape-state-estate-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/YSQ6-2EDF]; Julie Garber, How to Minimize Death Taxes, 
BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-minimize-death-taxes-3505688 [https://perma.cc/57VJ 
-8ZZV] (last updated Dec. 24, 2018). 











burden on death transfers without generating a significant amount of 
revenue.8  
While there appears to be little justification for the continuance of state 
death transfer taxes, it is arguable that they serve an important purpose by 
combatting wealth inequality in society.9 However, state death transfer 
taxes do not adequately address wealth inequality.10 Until all states impose 
an identical state death transfer tax, which is unlikely and perhaps nearly 
impossible, problems of interstate competition and taxpayers altering their 
behavior to avoid death transfer taxes will persist.11 State death transfer 
taxes cannot adequately address wealth inequality and provide little 
remaining benefit. The few remaining state death transfer taxes are at their 
end. These remaining states should consider a gradual repeal of the death 
transfer tax, allowing time for taxpayers to make changes to their estate 
planning.12 
Part I of this Note discusses the history and evolution of state death 
transfer taxes, including their rise, recent decline, and interaction with the 
federal estate tax, all of which are critical to understanding the current state 
of death transfer taxes and their imminent downfall. Part II examines the 
discriminatory effect of certain state death transfer taxes and the behavioral 
and revenue effects of all state death transfer taxes. Part III discusses the 
state death transfer tax’s questionable role in combatting wealth inequality, 
and its limitations for serving as a workable solution to rising wealth 
inequality. Part IV of this Note proposes that states consider a gradual repeal 
of all state death transfer taxes, or at the very least reform those death 
transfer taxes that are discriminatory in nature. This Note concludes that the 
remaining death transfer taxes are near their end and should soon be 
repealed because of their inability to provide any benefit to remaining states 
with such taxes.  
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF STATE DEATH TRANSFER TAXES 
A. History Before 1924 
The federal government instituted its first temporary death transfer tax 
in 1797.13 Until the more permanent modern federal estate tax was enacted 
                                                 
8. See infra Part II.C. States with a death transfer tax typically have approximately one percent 
of their overall state revenue come from the tax. See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text.  
9. See infra Part III. 
10. See infra Part III.  
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV. If states are unwilling to completely repeal their state death transfer tax, 
they should at the very least repeal any discriminatory aspect of their tax and impose a uniform rate on 
all residents and transfers. See infra Part IV.  












in 1916,14 temporary death transfer taxes were imposed several times at the 
federal level, often in conjunction with wartime efforts.15 Pennsylvania was 
the first to enact a state death transfer tax in 1826.16 Between 1826 and 1885 
a few other states also adopted death transfer taxes, but state adoptions were 
not widespread.17 That changed in 1885 when New York enacted an 
inheritance tax on collateral heirs,18 which led other states to enact similar 
death transfer taxes modeled on New York’s tax.19 The structure of state 
death transfer taxes around the end of the nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth century ranged from a flat rate on collateral heirs to a 
progressive tax on both lineal and collateral heirs.20  
When Congress enacted the modern federal estate tax in 1916,21 all but 
five states and the District of Columbia had a death transfer tax.22 By 1922, 
the number of states without a death transfer tax dropped to two plus the 
District of Columbia.23 In 1922, state death transfer taxes comprised roughly 
seven percent of total state tax revenues.24 However, between 1916 and 
1924, the few remaining states that did not have death transfer taxes began 
to try to lure residents with their favorable tax rates, creating interstate 
competition for wealthy residents.25 States became worried about competing 
                                                 
14. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 200, 39 Stat. 756, 777. 
15. Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 225−26 
(1956). 
16. Oakes, supra note 3, at 451 (citing 1826 Pa. Laws No. 72). The revenue was used to fund a 
new canal. Id. at 452.  
17. Id. at 451–54.  
18. 1885 N.Y. Laws 820. A “collateral heir” is “[s]omeone who is neither a direct descendant 
nor an ancestor of the decedent, but whose kinship is through a collateral line, such as a brother, sister, 
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, or cousin.” Heir, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). On the other 
hand, a “lineal heir” is “[s]omeone who is either an ancestor or a descendant of the decedent, such as a 
parent or a child.” Id.  
19. Oakes, supra note 3, at 457. 
20. Id. at 457−60. The progressive death transfer tax was more common at the time than the flat 
tax. Id. at 459–60. A progressive tax imposes an increasing marginal rate of tax as the estate or 
inheritance amount increases. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Our Current Tax v. The Flat Tax v. The Fair Tax: 
What’s The Difference?, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2015, 10:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillips 
erb/2015/08/07/our-current-tax-v-the-flat-tax-v-the-fair-tax-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/FK 
Q2-A7QD]. A flat tax imposes the same rate of tax regardless of the size of the estate or inheritance 
amount. Id.  
21. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 200, 39 Stat. 756, 777. 
22. See Oakes, supra note 3, at 468.  
23. Id.  
24. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 20 tbl.5 (1964). 
25. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in 
Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 837–38 (2006). Florida and Alabama, two of the three 
holdouts, actively advertised to and targeted wealthy individuals to move to their states because of their 
lack of a death transfer tax. JARED WALCZAK, TAX FOUND., STATE INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES: 
RATES, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, AND THE RETURN OF INTERSTATE COMPETITION 6−7 (2017), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171024103443/Tax-Foundation-SR2351.pdf [https://perma.cc/792U-9 
75W]. 











amongst each other for wealthy taxpayers.26 This competition led to three 
national conferences where states attempted to figure out a solution that 
would allow them to continue to collect death transfer tax revenue while 
preventing the migration of wealthy residents.27 The result of the three 
conferences was the Delano Committee Report, which proposed that the 
federal government pick up the cost of state death transfer taxation.28 
B. The 1924 Enactment of a Federal Credit for State Death Transfer 
Taxes 
In 1924, partly in response to the outcry from states following the 
enactment of the federal estate tax,29 the federal government passed the 
Revenue Act of 1924.30 The Act amended the Internal Revenue Code to 
provide a dollar-for-dollar credit on a federal estate tax return for state death 
transfer taxes paid.31 This change allowed states to place the burden of their 
death transfer taxes on the federal government rather than on their residents, 
effectively eliminating interstate competition.32 During a hearing regarding 
the Revenue Act of 1924, Senator Jones of New Mexico asked, “[W]ould it 
not be equitable for the Federal Government only to lay its hand upon that 
part of the inheritance after all State taxes and expenses have been deducted, 
regardless of the amount?”33 This statement indicates that at least one 
member of Congress supported the enactment of the credit as a form of 
deference to state death transfer taxes.34 
The credit was initially capped at twenty-five percent of the federal estate 
tax,35 but the cap was raised in 1926 to eighty percent.36 Iowa Congressman 
William Green, the individual behind the 1926 raise, proposed it seemingly 
to prevent states—most notably Florida—from attracting residents who 
wished to avoid state death transfer taxes.37 During a floor debate 
Congressman Green said, “Let me say to the people of Florida . . . . [You 
                                                 
26. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 7.  
27. Cooper, supra note 25, at 838−39. The first conference was held by the National Tax 
Association and resulted in the creation of the National Committee on Inheritance Taxation which held 
the next two conferences. E.M. Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause, 13 
N.C. L. REV. 271, 275−76 (1935). 
28. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 7. 
29. Id.  
30. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253.  
31. Revenue Act of 1924 § 301(b). 
32. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
33. Revenue Act of 1924: Hearings on H.R. 6715 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 68th Cong. 225 
(1924) (statement of Sen. Andrieus Jones, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).  
34. See id.  
35. Revenue Act of 1924 § 301(b). 
36. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 301(b), 44 Stat. 9, 70. 












are] filling up your community with members of that ancient dishonorable 
order of tax dodgers, who, of all citizens, are the most narrow, the most 
selfish, and the most unpatriotic.”38 Congressman Green, by raising the cap, 
sought to eradicate completely the problem of interstate competition and the 
benefit states without a death transfer tax reaped by attracting new, wealthy 
residents.39  
The federal credit for state death transfer taxes “became the foundation 
for many state death tax systems.”40 In the few years following 1926, almost 
every state adopted a death transfer tax equal to or above the maximum 
federal credit.41 Most states did not have an independent death transfer tax, 
but instead their tax was tied to the maximum federal credit, a tax known as 
a “pick-up tax.”42 After just a few years, the new federal credit “had 
effectively negated the interstate competition” for wealthy individuals that 
worried state governments just a few years earlier.43 
C. The EGTRRA of 2001 and the Demise of the Federal Credit 
The landscape of state death transfer taxes changed suddenly when 
Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001 (EGTRRA).44 Not only did EGTRRA increase the estate tax 
exclusion amount,45 reduce the maximum marginal estate tax rate,46 and 
gradually, but temporarily, repeal the federal estate tax,47 it also included a 
four-year phase-out of the state death transfer tax credit, completely 
                                                 
38. 69 CONG. REC. 964 (1925) (statement of Rep. Green). 
39. See id. 
40. Steven D. Nofziger, Comment, EGTRRA and the Past, Present, and Future of Oregon’s 
Inheritance Tax System, 84 OR. L. REV. 317, 320 (2005).  
41. Cooper, supra note 25, at 839−40. However, Nevada held out and did not adopt an estate tax 
until 1987. NEV. REV. STAT. § 375A.100 (1987). Some states imposed death transfer taxes above the 
pick-up tax threshold. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 7. But, by the close of the twentieth century, most 
states relied only on the pick-up tax. Cooper, supra note 25, at 875. 
42. Cooper, supra note 25, at 839.  
43. Id. at 860. The state death transfer tax credit caused a significant increase in state death 
transfer tax revenue. Death transfer taxes rose from an average of 7.9 percent of state revenue in 1915 
to an average of 10.1 percent in 1930. SUBCOMM. OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 72D CONG., 
DOUBLE TAXATION 132 (Comm. Print 1933).  
44. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
38 [hereinafter EGTRRA]. Just prior to EGTRRA, the state death transfer tax credit involved a graded 
scale where states could receive a maximum of sixteen percent of the total fifty-five percent federal 
estate tax rate levied on large estates. I.R.C. § 2011(b) (2000). 
45. EGTRRA, supra note 44, at § 521. The “exclusion amount” is an amount excluded from an 
estate’s gross value for purposes of calculating the tax owed at the federal level. Julie Garber, Exemption 
from Estate Taxes: Estate Tax Definition and the Exemption, BALANCE (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/exem ption-from-estate-taxes-3505525 [https://perma.cc/TVT6-GC4X].  
46. EGTRRA, supra note 44, at § 511.  
47. EGTRRA, supra note 44, at § 501.  











replacing it with a tax deduction by 2005.48 The state death transfer tax 
deduction was far less generous than the previous tax credit,49 and therefore 
gave new life to interstate competition and signaled the beginning of the 
downfall of state death transfer taxes.50 States could no longer rely on the 
federal government to largely bear the burden of state death transfer taxes. 
Congress likely replaced the credit with the deduction to generate federal 
revenue to ease the financial burdens of other changes in EGTRRA: 
The federal government passed EGTRRA, but seemingly wasn’t 
fully prepared to pay for it. Rather, by repealing the state death tax 
credit, the architects of EGTRRA placed much of the revenue burden 
on state governments. In fact, during most of the coming decade, the 
top net marginal federal estate tax rate may prove to be higher than it 
was prior to EGTRRA. Overall gross federal estate tax rates overtly 
decline, but it’s the states that lose much of the revenue as a result.51 
The federal credit may have been repealed and replaced to counter 
EGTRRA’s overall $1 trillion reduction in federal revenue in just the first 
ten years after its passage.52 
Because the majority of states prior to 2001 only relied on a pick-up tax 
and did not have an independent death transfer tax,53 the repeal of the federal 
credit effectively repealed many states’ death transfer taxes.54 A few states 
that previously had a pick-up tax enacted a stand-alone death transfer tax.55 
And a few states affirmatively repealed their death transfer tax after 
                                                 
48. EGTRRA §§ 531–532; see Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, Options 
to Reform the Estate Tax, URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., at 1, 2 (Mar. 2005), https://www.urban.or 
g/sites/default/files/publication/51521/311153-options-to-reform-the-estate-tax.pdf. [https://perma.cc/J 
D9V-YL5S].  
49. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 8. The repeal of the tax credit hurt taxpayers because the tax 
credit reduced total tax liability by a dollar-for-dollar amount, while the less-generous deduction only 
reduced the amount on which the taxpayer is taxed. Id. A deduction reduces taxable income and its value 
depends on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, while a credit reduces tax directly and does not depend on 
tax rates. What Are Tax Credits and How Do They Differ from Tax Deductions?, TAX POLICY CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-tax-credits-and-how-do-they-differ-tax-deduc 
tions [https://perma.cc/JG45-3CBH].  
50. Cooper, supra note 25, at 876–78.  
51. Jeffrey A. Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day’s Journey into Night, 
17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 317, 320−21 (2004).  
52. Changes in CBO’s Baseline Projections Since January 2001, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (June 
7, 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/06-07-changessinc 
e2001baseline.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA4X-E5EX]. 
53. See supra notes 41−42 and accompanying text.  
54. See Cooper, supra note 25, at 877. 
55. Norton Francis, Back from the Dead: State Estate Taxes After the Fiscal Cliff, URB.-














EGTRRA.56 After the repeal of the federal credit, states could no longer 
receive revenue from their death transfer taxes while allowing the federal 
government to bear the burden, reverting state death transfer taxes to their 
pre-1924 state.57  
Before EGTRRA, every state had some sort of a death transfer tax;58 
today only seventeen states and the District of Columbia have such a tax.59 
The decrease of states with a death transfer tax is partly due to the effective 
repeal of state pick-up taxes when the federal credit was repealed and the 
failure of states to subsequently enact an independent death transfer tax.60 
However, the decrease is also attributable to states gradually repealing their 
death transfers taxes in response to EGTRRA’s reintroduction of interstate 
competition.61  
D. State Death Transfer Taxes Today 
Today, eleven states (and the District of Columbia) impose an estate 
tax,62 five states impose an inheritance tax,63 and one state imposes both an 
estate tax and an inheritance tax.64 State estate taxes are typically imposed 
on the entirety of a decedent’s estate, regardless of to whom the bequests 
are made.65 Of the states that impose estate taxes today, top marginal rates 
                                                 
56. See Cooper, supra note 25, at 877–78. 
57. See supra Part I.A. 
58. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 8. 
59. See infra notes 62–64. Recent states to phase out or repeal state death transfer taxes include: 
Delaware (H.B. 16, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2017)); Indiana (H.B. 1001, 118th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013)); North Carolina (H.B. 998, 2013 Sess. Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013)); 
Tennessee (H.B. 3760, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012)); and Ohio (H.B. 3, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011)). 
60. Cooper, supra note 25, at 876–78. 
61. Id. at 878. “The state death tax uniformity of the late twentieth century is now but a memory. 
Interstate competition to attract wealthy residents begins anew. This time, Congress has left the fray, 
leaving state leaders to sort out matters for themselves.” Id. 
62. States that impose an estate tax are: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-391 (2018)); 
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 236E-8 (2018)); Illinois (35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/3 (2018)); Maine (ME. 
STAT. tit. 36, § 4103 (2018)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 65C, § 2A (2018)); Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. § 291.01 (2018)); New York (N.Y. TAX LAW § 952 (McKinney 2018)); Oregon (OR. REV. 
STAT. § 118.010 (2018)); Rhode Island (44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-22-1 (2018)); Vermont (VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 32, § 7442a (2018)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 83.100.040 (2018)). The District of 
Columbia also imposes an estate tax. D.C. CODE § 47-3702 (2018). 
63. States that impose an inheritance tax are: Iowa (IOWA CODE § 450.10 (2018)); Kentucky 
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.010 (West 2018)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2001 (2018)); New 
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-1 (West 2018)); and Pennsylvania (72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9106 (2018)). 
64. Maryland imposes both an inheritance tax and an estate tax. MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. §§ 
7-202, 7-302 (LexisNexis 2018). 
65. See supra note 1. 











range from sixteen percent66 to twenty percent.67 Two states simply impose 
a flat rate68 of tax of sixteen percent rather than using a marginal rate 
structure.69 States with estate taxes all provide an exclusion amount.70 
Exclusion amounts range from $1 million71 to $5.49 million.72 
Inheritance taxes differ from estate taxes in that they can, and often do, 
prescribe different tax rates based on the bequests.73 This is because the tax 
is not levied on the estate itself, but rather on bequests made from the 
estate.74 Of the states that impose inheritance taxes today, top rates range 
from ten percent75 to eighteen percent.76 However, inheritance tax rates do 
not apply uniformly to all bequests in each state. Today, state inheritance 
taxes differ between lineal heirs77 (e.g., spouses, parents, children, and 
grandchildren), collateral heirs78 (e.g., siblings, nieces, nephews, aunts, and 
uncles), and nonrelated heirs (e.g., neighbors and friends).79 States with 
inheritance taxes either exempt lineal heirs altogether,80 or tax them at more 
favorable rates than collateral heirs and nonrelatives.81 Further, most states 
tax collateral heirs at a more preferential rate than nonrelatives.82 
                                                 
66. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 3 (using rates from the year 2017). The states that impose 
a top marginal rate of sixteen percent include Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. Id. 
67. Id. Washington is the only state to impose a top marginal rate of twenty percent. Id.  
68. See supra note 20. 
69. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 3. These states are Vermont and Maryland. Id. 
70. See supra note 45. 
71. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 3. Massachusetts and Oregon provide for an exclusion 
amount of $1 million. 
72. Id. Hawaii and Maine provide for an exclusion amount of $5.49 million. Id. This amount is 
tied to the federal exclusion amount. HAW. REV. STAT. § 236E-6(a) (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 36, § 4102(5) 
(2018).   
73. See supra note 1. 
74. Id. 
75. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 3. Maryland imposes an inheritance tax rate of only ten 
percent. MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. § 7-204(b) (LexisNexis 2018). 
76. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 3. Nebraska imposes an inheritance tax rate of eighteen 
percent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2006 (2018). 
77. See supra note 18. 
78. Id. 
79. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 16. 
80. IOWA CODE § 450.9 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. § 7-203(b) (LexisNexis 2018); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 54:34-2 (West 2018); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9111 (2018). 
81. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.070 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2001; 77-2004 (2018). 
However, while Kentucky does impose an inheritance tax on most lineal heir bequests, Kentucky 
exempts all bequests to surviving spouses and certain limited amounts to other lineal heirs. KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 140.080 (West 2018). 
82. IOWA CODE §§ 450.9−10 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.070 (West 2018); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 77-2006 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-2; 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9116 (2018). However, 
Maryland taxes most collateral heirs and nonrelative heirs at the same rate. MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. 












E. The Federal Estate Tax 
The modern federal estate tax was first enacted in 1916 with World War 
I as a backdrop.83 Congress at the time saw death transfers as a large source 
of untapped but much needed revenue.84 The House Ways and Means 
Committee reported that the revenue system would “be more evenly and 
equitably balanced” if “a larger portion of our necessary revenues” were 
“collected from the incomes and inheritances of those deriving the most 
benefit and protection from the Government.”85 
Currently, the Internal Revenue Code requires an estate tax to be paid on 
estates exceeding an exclusion amount.86 For 2017, that exclusion amount 
was $5.49 million per individual.87 The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 201788 
raised the exclusion amount for 2018 to $11,180,000.89 The exclusion 
amount has regularly and significantly been increased even before 2017 and 
2018.90 Further, in 2010, an estate tax portability provision was enacted, 
allowing a surviving spouse to use his or her deceased spouse’s unused 
exclusion amount.91 The 2018 exclusion and the spousal portability 
provision allow a married couple to transfer over $22 million at death 
without being subject to the federal estate tax.92 
In recent decades there has been movement to repeal the federal estate 
tax. The EGTRRA of 2001 would have temporarily repealed the federal 
estate tax in 2010, but without further action by Congress, the estate tax law 
would have reverted to its pre-EGTRRA state in 2011.93 In December 2010, 
Congress passed the 2010 Tax Act, which reinstated the estate tax for 2010 
retroactively and instituted it for all future years.94 Though in recent years 
                                                 
83. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 200, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916); see Eisenstein, 
supra note 15, at 230. 
84. Eisenstein, supra note 15, at 230.  
85. S. REP. NO. 64-793, at 3 (1916). 
86. I.R.C. § 2001 (2018).  
87. Estate Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-sel 
f-employed/estate-tax [https://perma.cc/Z5C5-W78E] (last updated Nov. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Estate 
Tax (IRS)]. 
88. Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11061, 131 Stat. 2054, 2091 (2017) 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3)). 
89. Estate Tax (IRS), supra note 87. For 2019, the exclusion amount is $11.4 million. Id. 
90. In 2004, the exclusion amount was $1.5 million, in 2006 it was $2 million, and in 2009 it 
was $3.5 million. Id. 
91. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.  
92. See id. 
93. EGTRRA, supra note 44, at § 501. 
94. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-312, § 301, 124 Stat. 3296, 3300; see Genevieve M. Moore, Understanding the Implications 
of the Temporary Repeal of the Federal Estate Tax, LexisNexis (Mar. 29, 2010), https://www.lexisnexis. 
com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/how-do-i/posts/understanding-the-implications-of-the-temporary-repe 
al-of-the-federal-estate-tax [https://perma.cc/RQK3-YNRP]. 











there has again been support to repeal the federal estate tax, the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017 ultimately did not repeal it.95 However, since the 2017 
Tax Act, there has again been push to repeal the federal estate tax.96 
II. THE EFFECTS OF CURRENT STATE DEATH TRANSFER TAXES 
State death transfer taxes today have three effects that signal that their 
end is here: (1) a discriminatory effect; (2) a behavioral effect; and (3) a 
revenue (or lack of revenue) effect.  
A. The Discriminatory Effect 
Inheritance taxes today tax lineal heirs at a more preferential rate than 
collateral heirs, and collateral heirs at a more preferential rate than 
nonrelative heirs.97 To illustrate the discriminatory nature of current 
inheritance taxes, this Note will examine Iowa’s inheritance tax. Iowa’s 
inheritance tax has been characterized as “the nation’s most complicated,”98 
so it is ripe for an in-depth examination. In Iowa, there is no tax if the net 
estate is less than $25,000.99 Bequests to surviving spouses and lineal heirs 
are not subject to the tax.100 There are different rate schedules for: (1) 
brother, sister, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law (five to ten percent marginal 
tax rate);101 (2) uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, foster child, cousin, brother-in-
law, sister-in-law, step-grandchild, and all other individual persons (ten or 
fifteen percent marginal tax rate);102 (3) firm, corporation, or society 
organized for profit (flat fifteen percent tax rate);103 (4) charitable, 
educational, or religious organization organized under the law of any other 
state or foreign country (flat ten percent tax rate);104 (5) unknown heirs due 
to contingent events (flat five percent tax rate);105 and (6) charitable, 
educational, or religious purposes as defined by the Internal Revenue Code, 
and public institutions within the state Iowa (no tax).106 The Iowa 
                                                 
95. See Russell Berman, What’s in—and out of—the Final Republican Tax Bill, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/final-trump-republican-tax-bill-promis 
es-details/548603/ [https://perma.cc/6DSM-CWKS]. 
96. See, e.g., S. 215, 116th Cong (1st Sess. 2019) (Senate bill proposed on January 24, 2019 to 
repeal the federal estate tax). 
97. See supra notes 80−82 and accompanying text.  
98. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 16.  
99. IOWA CODE § 450.4 (2018). 
100. § 450.9. 
101. § 450.10(1).  
102. § 450.10(2). 
103. § 410.10(4). 
104. § 410.10(3). 
105. § 450.93. 












inheritance tax rate schedules favor different groups of individual or 
organizational heirs over others. 
The constitutionality of an inheritance tax such as Iowa’s has been 
questioned because classes of individuals are subject to differing treatment. 
In Tyler v. Iowa Department of Revenue,107 the Iowa Supreme Court held 
that the Iowa inheritance tax does not violate the Iowa State Constitution’s 
equal protection clause because different tax treatment of different classes 
of beneficiaries “is rationally related to the legislature’s legitimate state 
interest in promoting and preserving family relationships through the tax 
laws.”108 The Iowa Supreme Court found that “[f]avorable tax treatment of 
intrafamily transfers . . . allows more assets to remain within the family. 
This strengthens the family and helps the family maintain financial security. 
Such tax laws also incentivize persons to keep their wealth within that group 
rather than transferring it outside.”109 Other courts faced with challenges to 
the discriminatory nature of state inheritance taxes have similarly upheld 
such taxes against equal protection claims.110 
American families have been changing in recent decades, and the 
traditional family (a married couple with children) no longer represents the 
vast majority of families in the United States.111 The non-traditional family, 
on the rise today, may consist of an unmarried couple,112 a single parent,113 
or a stepfamily. While the idea of a family has been changing in recent 
decades, the structures of state inheritance taxes have not. State inheritance 
                                                 
107. 904 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 2017).  
108. Id. at 164. The Iowa Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to its review of the 
challenged inheritance tax. Id. at 166. “Under the rational basis test, ‘the statute need only be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.’” Id. (quoting Qwest Corp. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 829 
N.W.2d 550, 558 (Iowa 2013)).  
109. Id. at 168. 
110. See, e.g., Beals v. Comm’r of Corps. & Taxation, 352 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Mass. 1976) 
(“[I]mposing an inheritance tax when an adopted child of a lineal descendant receives property and no 
such tax when a natural child of a lineal descendant receives property in the same circumstances does 
not deny equal protection of the laws.”); Estate of Kunkel v. United States, 689 F.2d 408, 416–17 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (Pennsylvania’s inheritance tax statute, imposing a higher tax rate on bequests to step-
grandchildren than on bequests to step-children, children of one’s adopted children, and spouses does 
not deny equal protection).  
111. In 1950, approximately eighty percent of households were married households. Percent of 
Households by Type, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/ 
visualizations/time-series/demo/families-and-households/hh-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM8Y-WR3Y]. 
However, in 2017, that number was less than fifty percent. Id.  
112. In 1950, married couples made up ninety-three percent of all families with children under 
age eighteen. The Majority of Children Live with Two Parents, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-192.html [http 
s://perma.cc/22D8-7AVS]. In 2016, that number dropped to sixty-eight percent. Id. In 2016, more than 
eight million opposite-sex couples live together without being married. Id. 
113. In 1960, the percentage of children living in families with two parents was eighty-eight 
percent. Id. In 2016, that number decreased to sixty-nine percent. Id. In 1960, eight percent of children 
lived only with their mother, but by 2016 that number had risen to twenty-three percent. Id. 











taxes still highly favor lineal relatives, favor non-lineal relatives, and 
disfavor nonrelatives.114  
Nontraditional families face a variety of potential problems when it 
comes to an inheritance tax that discriminates against different 
relationships. For example, unmarried couples may be subject to a state 
inheritance tax on bequests to each other. Even the bequests of childless 
married couples to other family members, such as nieces and nephews, or 
to friends, may be subject to an inheritance tax. “[T]he inheritance tax’s lack 
of acknowledgment of nontraditional families not only fails to adequately 
reflect the population but creates an unfair preference for traditional family 
structures while placing nontraditional families at a disadvantage.”115 
Current state inheritance taxes favor family relationships over 
friendships (and further favor lineal family relationships over non-lineal 
family relationships).116 A potential reason for this favoritism is that states 
desire to incentivize family behavior and allow for a private safety net 
created by family bequests.117 However, this reasoning, while laudable, is 
outdated. While it may be a worthy cause to encourage familial behavior 
and a private safety net, it should not be at the expense of the nontraditional 
family, those who choose not to have children, and those who consider 
nonrelatives to be their family. The idea that the lineal family should be 
incentivized over other relationships is no longer viable due to the gradual 
increase over time of nontraditional families. States should provide equal 
treatment to traditional families and all others by taxing all bequests at the 
same rate.118  
B. The Behavior Effect 
History shows state death transfer taxes affect individual behavior. When 
interstate competition first began in the early 1920s following the enactment 
of the federal estate tax, some states were actively trying to lure wealthy 
residents with the promise of no death transfer tax.119 Many state leaders 
                                                 
114. See supra notes 80−82 and accompanying text.  
115. Brittany J. Faulkner, Note, “The Ugly Stepsister”—Inheriting the Defects of Nebraska’s 
Inheritance Tax, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285, 305 (2013). Additionally, the discriminatory inheritance 
tax punishes nontraditional families who do not do sufficient tax planning that is above and beyond what 
would be required by traditional families to achieve similar results. See Mary Ellen Wimberly, Note, No 
State Left Behind: An Analysis of the Post-EGTRRA Death Tax Landscape and an Argument for 
Kentucky to Repeal State Death Taxes, 104 KY. L.J. 525, 537 (2015−2016).  
116. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
117. Margaret Ryznar, The Odd Couple: The Estate Tax and Family Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 523, 
546 (2015); see Tyler v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 904 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Iowa 2017).  
118. This Note argues that the discriminatory rate structures of state inheritance taxes is just one 
reason of many for the need for their repeal. But if states are unwilling to consider total repeal of their 
state inheritance tax, they should at least consider adopting a nondiscriminatory structure.  












were worried that death transfer taxes would cause a mass exodus of 
wealthy residents to states without such a tax, which led to the ultimate 
enactment of the federal credit for state death transfer taxes paid.120  
Residents of states with a death transfer tax may weigh the cost of the 
tax against the expense of domiciling in another state without such a tax, 
and may conclude that relocating is the more efficient option. There may 
also be other benefits in favor of changing domicile to avoid a state death 
transfer tax, such as moving to a state where one already has family and 
friends, where there are many employment opportunities, and where there 
is a warmer climate (for example, Florida).121 Additionally, it may be quite 
easy for wealthy residents to establish their domicile in a different state as 
they may already have a second home in another state.122 On the other hand, 
the costs of moving are substantial, including transportation to a new state, 
a possible increase in the cost of living, the emotional costs of leaving one’s 
home behind, and the cost of finding new employment.123 
The tradeoff of moving to a different state to avoid a state death transfer 
tax may result in an individual choosing to relocate. There is evidence 
showing that many individuals make this tradeoff. One study found that 
“[c]ontrolling for state- and wealth-class specific fixed effects . . . high state 
inheritance and estate taxes . . . have statistically significant, but modest, 
negative impacts on the number of federal estate tax returns filed in a 
state.”124 The possibility of ante-mortem capital flight of wealthy residents 
is a real threat to a continuing regime in which some states have death 
transfer taxes and others do not.  
A state should not encourage its residents to move to another state 
through its use of a death transfer tax. Capital flight away from a state leads 
to a decrease in revenue for the state.125 Property and income that is taken 
out of a state can no longer be taxed by that state, whether through a death 
transfer tax, an income tax, or any other sort of state tax. The repeal of the 
federal credit for state death transfer taxes126 has reintroduced the old but 
familiar problems of interstate competition and ante-mortem capital flight.  
                                                 
120. Id.; see supra Part I.A−B.  
121. Timothy J. Witt, Comment, Individuals and Inheritance Taxes: A Praxeological 
Examination of Pennsylvania’s Inheritance Tax, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2010). 
122. Id. at 1130. Those who move to warmer states during the winter are referred to as 
“snowbirds,” and changing one’s domicile would be especially easy for these individuals. See Faulkner, 
supra note 115, at 299. 
123. Witt, supra note 121, at 1128−29. 
124. Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes? Evidence from Federal 
Estate Tax Returns (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645, 2004), http://www.nbe 
r.org/papers/w10645 [https://perma.cc/TT59-YY8L]. 
125. See Witt, supra note 121, at 1130−31. 
126. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  











Residents of states with death transfer taxes do not necessarily need to 
go to the extreme of moving states to avoid such a tax. Other undesirable 
tactics have been developed to avoid state death transfer taxation. If a state 
does not impose a gift tax, one simple tactic to avoid a state death transfer 
tax is to make an inter vivos gift.127 Individuals may also shift their assets 
and investments, such as by selling one’s business before death, utilizing a 
tax-advantaged vehicle, or bringing children on as owners of a home or co-
investors in a business.128 Individuals may also transfer their property to a 
foreign limited liability company, which allows such individuals to dodge a 
state death transfer tax because the chosen foreign jurisdiction does not have 
the tax.129 The availability of these tactics encourages individuals to shift 
resources from their most productive uses to less efficient uses to avoid a 
state death transfer tax.130 State death transfer taxes should not encourage 
these avoidance tactics.  
Individuals may also try to avoid a state death transfer tax by simply not 
reporting death transfers at all. It may be difficult for individuals to avoid 
reporting a real estate transfer, but personal property, such as family 
heirlooms, “are the most difficult assets to track.”131 Individuals may easily 
avoid reporting transfers of personal property, and thus avoid a state death 
transfer tax altogether.132  
The repeal of the federal credit for state death transfer taxes reintroduced 
the same sort of interstate competition that was present pre-1924.133 Once 
again state death transfer taxes encourage behavior that should not be 
encouraged—ante-mortem capital flight, tactics that avoid taxation but also 
avoid the most productive use of property, and outright failure to report. The 
effect that state death transfer taxes have on individual behavior is a strong 
indication of the need for their complete repeal.  
                                                 
127. See Nofziger, supra note 40, at 351−52. Property given as a gift during one’s lifetime (an 
inter vivos gift) may not be included in the gross estate at one’s death, and thus may not be subject to a 
state death transfer tax (depending on the state’s specific statutes and whether or not there is some sort 
of a gift tax). Id. But individuals should still be wary of the federal gift tax if they use this tactic to avoid 
state death transfer taxes. See I.R.C. § 2503 (2018).  
128. WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 20. 
129. Faulkner, supra note 115, at 298−99. “The inheritance tax does not tax the intangible property 
of a non-resident, which includes interests in foreign limited liability companies. Therefore, the state 
cannot impose an inheritance tax upon an individual’s transferred interest in a foreign limited liability 
company.” Id. at 299; see also Nofziger, supra note 40, at 350; Curt S. Steger, Note, Dodging the Tax 
Bullet: The Use of Foreign Limited Liability Companies by Retired Farmers to Limit State Inheritance 
Tax Liability for the Next Generation of Small Farmers, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 167, 198 (2010).  
130. See WALCZAK, supra note 25, at 21.  
131. Faulkner, supra note 115, at 298.  
132. See id.  












C. The Revenue Effect 
When state death transfer taxes were popular in the early 1920s134 they 
comprised roughly 7% of total state tax revenue.135 Following the enactment 
of the federal state death transfer tax credit in 1924, state death transfer tax 
revenue rose from 7.9% of state revenue in 1915 to 10.1% of state revenue 
in 1930.136 Generating state revenue was a prominent reason for the 
popularity of state death transfer taxes during that time period.137  
However, state death transfer taxes today are no longer generating 
substantial revenue. The percentage of state revenue from death transfer 
taxes has declined since their peak in the early 1900s.138 In 2017, Iowa’s 
inheritance tax made up approximately 1% of the state’s revenue,139 
Washington’s estate tax made up approximately 0.8% of its revenue,140 and 
New York’s estate tax made up approximately 1.5% of its revenue.141 Other 
states that have a state death tax transfer and report death tax transfer 
revenue typically receive around 1% of their revenue from the tax.142 It is 
                                                 
134. See supra note 22−24 and accompanying text. 
135. Cooper, supra note 25, at 837. 
136. See supra note 43. 
137. See supra Part I.A−B.  
138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
139. Jeff Robinson, Monthly General Fund Revenue Receipts Through June 30, 2017, IOWA 
LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, at 5 (July 3, 2017), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/MM/858418. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AM-LQ6T]. 
140. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX STATISTICS 2017, at 7 (2017), https://dor.wa.gov/site 
s/default/files/legacy/Docs/Reports/2017/Tax_Statistics_2017/Tax_Statistics_2017.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/8RS7-R2L8]. 
141. N.Y. DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FIN., 2016-2017 NEW YORK STATE TAX COLLECTIONS: 
STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AND HISTORICAL TABLES 6 (Aug. 2017), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/2016-1 
7_collections/2016_17_Collections_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY3K-S57Z]. 
142. Connecticut received about 1.3% of its revenue from its estate tax in 2017. Revenue, 
Connecticut’s Finances, http://ctstatefinance.org/revenue [https://perma.cc/63JH-9CEY]. Hawaii 
received about 0.7% of its revenue from its estate tax in 2016. DEP’T OF TAXATION STATE OF HAWAII, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2015–2016, at 1, 29, files.hawaii.gov/tax/stats/stats/annual/16annrpt.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/DU7F-HNRK]. Illinois received about 0.7% of its revenue from its estate tax in 2017. Craig 
Lesner, Tax Day 2017: Where Does Illinois’ $38.1 Billion in Tax Revenue Come From?, ILLINOIS 
POLICY (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/tax-day-2017-where-does-illinois-38-1-billion-
in-tax-revenue-come-from/ [https://perma.cc/5SCM-RUAC]; State Revenue by Revenue Source, State 
of Illinois Comptroller, https://illinoiscomptroller.gov/financial-data/state-revenues/by-revenue-source/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7XX-H5BX] (data obtainable by searching for “Estate Taxes” revenue in 2017). 
Maine received about 0.4% of its revenue from its estate tax in 2010. DAN COYNE, MAINE REVENUE & 
SPENDING PRIMER 2011 7, https://www.mecep.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Maine_Revenue_an 
d_Spending_Primer_2011-3-4-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P73M-3ML6]. The District of Columbia 
received about 0.8% of its revenue from its estate tax in 2015. D.C. FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, 
REVENUE: WHERE D.C. GETS ITS MONEY 4 (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.dcfpi.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/08/Revenue-Primer-2016-FINAL-VERSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2SN-T5DJ]. Kentucky 
received about 0.5% of its revenue from its inheritance tax in 2016. KENTUCKY DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
2015-2016 KENTUCKY DEP’T OF REVENUE ANNUAL REPORT 2, https://revenue.ky.gov/News/Publicatio 
ns/Annual%20Reports/20152016%20Annual%20Report_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDR8-TEPS]. 
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difficult to justify the continuance of state death transfer taxes given their 
dwindling revenue creation.  
In addition to little revenue generated by state death transfer taxes, there 
may be high administrative and compliance costs to the taxes. Some have 
argued that administrative and compliance costs outweigh the revenue 
generated by death transfer taxes. A 2012 Republican Joint Economics 
Committee Report found that administrative and compliance costs of the 
federal estate tax exceeded the amount of revenue collected by the tax.143 If 
the administrative and compliance costs of a tax are greater than revenue 
generated by the tax, then it would be economically sensible to repeal the 
tax. Although there is no state data available, the same high administrative 
costs may exist at the state level and thus weigh in favor of repealing state 
death transfer taxes.  
A solution to counteract the declining state revenue from state death 
transfer taxes may be to increase the tax rates. However, this is only a short-
term solution to increase state revenue. In the long term, a higher death 
transfer tax rate may cause residents to leave the state or be a barrier for new 
wealthy residents to come to the state: “[S]tate revenue would likely decline 
in the long term as individuals responded to those high inheritance tax rates. 
Rapidly declining state revenue would result from high inheritance taxes 
and their effect on ante-mortem capital consumption, ante-mortem capital 
flight, and post-mortem capital consumption.”144  
One of the original purposes of state death transfer taxes was to raise 
revenue.145 However, today the remaining state death transfer taxes are not 
creating much revenue for states. If state death transfer taxes are not 
generating much revenue, then there may be no justification for their 
continuance, and it may be time for their repeal.  
  
                                                 
Fiscal Year, PENNWATCH, http://pennwatch.pa.gov/revenue/Pages/Revenue-Source-by-Fiscal-Year. 
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General-Fund-Revenues.pdf [https://perma.cc/52SX-EHPW]. 
143. STAFF OF J. ECON. COMM. REPUBLICANS, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEDERAL 
ESTATE TAX: AN UPDATE (July 25, 2012), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/bc9424c1-88 
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& Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 TAX NOTES 591, 630 tbl.14 (1999). 
144. Witt, supra note 121, at 1135 (footnotes omitted).  
145. See supra Part I.A−B. States were fearful pre-1924 when the few states without a state death 
transfer tax attempted to attract wealthy residents who did not wish to pay such a tax. See supra notes 












III. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND STATE DEATH TRANSFER TAXES 
This Note argues that it is time for state death transfer taxes to be 
repealed because some are discriminatory, all negatively alter individuals’ 
behavior, and all fail to raise enough revenue to justify their continuance. 
However, this Note does not also argue that the federal estate tax should be 
repealed.146 In 2014, federal estate and gift taxes provided approximately 
0.6% of total federal revenue,147 which is approximately the same 
percentage or even less than a state’s revenue from a death transfer tax.148 
While both the federal estate tax and state death transfer taxes fail to account 
for much revenue, the federal estate tax is achieving an important purpose 
that state death transfer taxes cannot achieve—reducing wealth inequality 
in society.  
Wealth inequality is a problem in the United States—and the problem is 
growing. In 1983, the top ten percent of households controlled 68.2% of the 
total wealth in society, while the bottom sixty percent controlled only 6.1%; 
and, in 2007, the top ten percent of households controlled 73.1% of the total 
wealth in society, while the bottom sixty percent only controlled 4.2%.149 
Another recent study found that the top tenth of a percent of individuals held 
twenty-two percent of the wealth in 2012, up from seven percent in 1978.150 
Inheritances account for forty percent of all wealth in the United States and 
four percent of annual household income.151 That only 0.2% of deaths in the 
United States in 2014 resulted in federal estate tax liability152 demonstrates 
just how concentrated wealth is with certain individuals.153 The federal 
                                                 
146. In fact, this Note supports the federal estate tax because it works to eliminate wealth 
inequality in society. See infra notes 154−56 and accompanying text.  
147. Andrew Lundeen, The Estate Tax Provides Less than One Percent of Federal Revenue, TAX 
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148. See supra notes 139−42 and accompanying text. 
149. 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know, STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY 
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oon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/E7M3-2QVW]. 
152. See The Federal Estate Tax: A Critical and Highly Progressive Revenue Source, INST. ON 
TAXATION & ECON. POLICY 1 (Dec. 2016), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/estatetaxreport1216.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YG63-6CAD] [hereinafter The Federal Estate Tax (Institute)]. 
153. In 2014, the exemption amount was $5,340,000, thus the only estates that paid the estate tax 
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estate tax can be used to moderate the accumulation of wealth and alleviate 
wealth inequality.154 
Arguably, the most important purpose of the federal estate tax is to lessen 
wealth inequality in society. As two authors explained: 
Because it affects only those who are most able to pay, the estate tax 
is the most progressive component of a tax code that overall is only 
modestly progressive, particularly when regressive state and local 
taxes are taken into account. It is also the nation’s most effective tax 
policy tool to mitigate the negative effects of inheritances, which 
account for about 40 percent of household wealth and are extremely 
concentrated at the top. Because they are correlated with the parent’s 
economic outcomes and provide an alternative to earned income, 
inheritances likely limit intergenerational mobility.155 
Large inheritances keep wealth within a small percentage of individuals and 
prevent redistribution of wealth that is concentrated in large inheritances. 
The federal estate tax combats growing wealth inequalities that results 
partly due to large inheritances. 
While a major justification for the federal estate tax is that it limits wealth 
inequality in the United States,156 it is difficult to also apply this justification 
to state death transfer taxes. The federal estate tax is already working to 
combat wealth inequality, so it is questionable whether state death transfer 
taxes are needed as well.157 But it is arguable that the federal estate tax alone 
does not do enough to alleviate wealth inequality, and that additional state 
death transfer taxes are needed to limit large inheritances. It may also be 
argued that the federal estate tax exemption amount is too large, and the 
exemption amounts for many state estate taxes, which are often smaller than 
the federal exemption amount,158 are appropriate to target those estates that 
are not quite large enough to trigger the federal estate tax. However, as big 
a problem as wealth inequality may be, state death transfer taxes are not a 
workable solution.  
                                                 
only 0.2% of deaths in the United States in 2014 resulted in federal estate tax liability also demonstrates 
that the federal exemption amount is too high—an argument that is beyond the scope of this Note.  
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156. See Krisanne M. Schlachter, Note, Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen 
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It is highly unlikely that all fifty states could agree on and impose a single 
death transfer tax structure. Without all states having the same death transfer 
tax or the reintroduction of the federal credit for state death transfer taxes,159 
the problems of interstate competition will forever persist.160 The solution 
then to wealth inequality does not lie with state death transfer taxes, and 
combatting wealth inequality cannot be used as their justification. State 
death transfer taxes are not an effective tool because they will also revive 
interstate competition that state legislators pre-1924 sought desperately to 
avoid.161 The solution to wealth inequality lies elsewhere, perhaps with a 
change to the federal estate tax by raising rates and decreasing the 
exemption amount, because the federal estate tax will not create problems 
of interstate competition.162  
IV. HOW STATES SHOULD RESPOND TO THE END OF STATE DEATH 
TRANSFER TAXES 
It is time for state death transfer taxes to end. Many state death transfer 
taxes are discriminatory.163 All remaining taxes create interstate competition 
for wealthy residents and incentivize tax-avoidance behavior.164 All 
remaining taxes generate little in revenue.165 Additionally, state death 
transfer taxes cannot be a workable solution to wealth inequality in the 
United States.166 With no justification for their continuance, states should 
consider repealing their death transfer taxes.  
A. Repeal the State Death Transfer Tax 
The remaining states with a death transfer tax should gradually repeal 
their tax over a period of years to allow taxpayers time to react to the change 
                                                 
159. Both are unlikely to happen. It would be nearly impossible to get all fifty state legislatures to 
agree on a single death transfer tax structure. And the federal government would likely be wary of 
reintroducing the federal credit because it would reduce the federal government estate tax revenue. 
160. See supra Part II.B. Additionally, in some states the purpose of the death transfer tax is clearly 
not to combat wealth inequality since their tax either exempts all bequests made to lineal heirs or taxes 
those bequests at highly preferential rates, which likely make up a large percentage of all bequests. See, 
e.g., IOWA CODE § 450.9 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.070 (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–
GEN. § 7-203(b) (LexisNexis 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2004 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-2 
(West 2018); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9116(a) (2018). 
161. See supra notes 25−28 and accompanying text.  
162. This Note cautions against repealing the federal estate tax, which has been considered in 
recent years. See supra notes 93−96 and accompanying text. A repeal would eliminate a powerful tool 
against wealth inequality. However, the arguments for and against strengthening the federal estate tax 
are outside the scope of this Note.  
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and to allow legislatures to make up for any budget shortfalls. A few states 
that have recently repealed their death transfer tax have done so gradually. 
Tennessee, for example, passed a bill in 2012 that phased out its inheritance 
tax by gradually raising its exemption amount until 2016, when the tax was 
completely eliminated.167 Indiana also enacted a law in 2012 that would 
phase out Indiana’s inheritance tax over nine years.168 On the other hand, 
some states have retroactively repealed their state death transfer tax, such 
as North Carolina, which enacted a bill on July 23, 2013, that repealed its 
estate tax retroactively on January 1, 2013.169 And still other states have 
enacted legislation completely repealing their state death transfer tax a few 
months after enactment.170 
A gradual repeal of death transfer taxes rather than a complete and 
immediate repeal is better for states and their taxpayers. It allows states time 
to either find alternative revenue sources or eliminate items from their 
budget due to the decrease in revenue. An immediate repeal of a death 
transfer tax may leave a state scrambling to make up lost revenue or 
deciding what to cut from its budget.171 Additionally, a gradual repeal will 
give state residents notice of the change and allow them time to respond 
with changes to their estate plans. An immediate repeal, or even a 
retroactive repeal, may leave taxpayers with little time to alter estate plans 
in response to the repeal.  
B. At the Least, Repeal the Discriminatory Death Transfer Tax 
If states with a discriminatory death transfer tax172 are not willing to fully 
repeal their tax, then they should at least amend their tax so that all bequests 
are taxed at the same rate. With the recent changes to the make-up of United 
States households, the idea that transfers to lineal heirs should be preferred 
is outdated.173 Eliminating discriminatory rate structures in state death 
transfer taxes will at least eliminate disfavored treatment given to collateral 
heirs and nonrelated heirs, although the current landscape favors total repeal 
of all state death transfer taxes. 
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It is time for the remaining states with death transfer taxes to consider 
repeal. Some state death transfer taxes have rates that give preferential 
treatment to bequests that are likely on the decline due to changes in 
household structure.174 State death transfer taxes, as a result of interstate 
competition, give incentives to people to move states, underreport death 
transfers, and use other tactics to avoid a state death transfer tax.175 State 
death transfer taxes are failing to be a significant source of state revenue.176 
Additionally, state death transfer taxes cannot be an effective tool to combat 
wealth inequality.177 Without any justification and serving no purpose, the 
state death transfer tax is at its end. The remaining states with a death 
transfer tax should begin the process of repeal.  
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